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 Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics 
Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are technologies that seem to be of major importance for the 
development of humanity in the near future. They have raised fundamental questions about what we 
should do with these systems, what the systems themselves should do, and what risks they involve in 
the long term. They also challenge the human view of humanity as the sole intelligent and dominant 
species on Earth. The main division of this article is into issues that arise with AI systems as objects, 
i.e. tools made and used by humans (2), vs. AI systems as autonomous subjects, i.e. when ethics is for 
the AI systems themselves (3). The problem of a future ‘singularity’ or ‘superintelligence’ concerns 
both ethical use of AI and the ethics for AI systems – thus the separate final section (4). 
The sections are ordered by ethical issue, rather than by technology: For each section we provide a 
general explanation of the issue, positions and arguments, then look how this plays out with current 
technologies and finally what policy consequences may be drawn. This means we have occasion to 
look at ethical issues that arise from utility of consequences, including ‘risk’, as well as issues that arise 
from a conflict with virtues, rules, or values. In sections (2.2) and (3.2) we also discuss questions of a 
more theoretical nature about ‘artificial moral agents’, in particular under which conditions an agent 
should be taken to have rights and responsibilities. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Field 
The ethics of AI and robotics is often focused on ‘concerns’ of various sorts – such concerns are 
characteristic of new technologies: Many of these concerns will turn out to be rather quaint (such as 
that trains are too fast for souls), some predictably wrong when they suggest that humans will change 
fundamentally (telephones will destroy personal communication, writing will destroy memory, or video 
cassettes will make going out redundant - https://xkcd.com/1289/), some predictably correct but 
moderately relevant (digital technology will destroy industries that make photographic film, cassette 
tapes, or LP records), but some broadly correct and relevant (such as that cars will kill children, change 
the landscape, and challenge good sleep). The task of an article such as this is to analyse the issues, and 
to deflate the non-issues - always keeping in mind that technologies are situated in a social and 
historical context. Some technologies, like nuclear power, cars or plastics, have caused ethical and 
political discussion and significant policy efforts to control the trajectory that these technologies are 
taking – usually once the damage is done. In addition to such ‘ethical concerns’, new technologies 
challenge current norms, conceptual systems and societal structures, which is of particular interest to 
philosophy. Finally, once we have understood a technology in its context, we need to shape our societal 
response, including regulation and law. All these concerns also exist in the case of the new technology 
of “artificial intelligence” or AI, and robotics – plus the more fundamental fear that it may end the era 
of human control on planet Earth. 
In short, our philosophical task here is to present an orientation and analysis of the issues, the positions 
and the arguments in the ethics of AI and robotics – with an outlook on policy.  
The ethics of AI and robotics have seen significant press coverage in recent years, which supports this 
kind of work, but also may end up undermining it: It often talks as if we already knew what would be 
ethical, and the issues are just what future technology will bring, and what we should do about it; as if 
the issues were only considerations of risk, security (Brundage et al. 2018), and the prediction of 
impact (e.g. in the job market). These are essentially technical problems, on how to achieve the 
outcome we know to be right; a problem of ethics, however, would require that we do not already 
know what is the right thing to do, perhaps because we do not know which are the factors that matter or 
because there is a tension between different values or consequences. In this sense, deception, theft and 
killing with AI are not a problem for ethics, but whether these are permissible under certain 
circumstances is a problem. Therefore, this article does not follow much of the current discussion in 
policy and industry with its focus on image and public relations – where the label “ethical” is really not 
much more than the new “green”. Instead it focuses on the genuine problems of ethics where we do not 
readily know what the answers are. 
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A caveat is in order for our presentation: The ethics of AI and robotics is a very young field within 
applied ethics, with significant dynamics but few well-established issues and no authoritative 
overviews, though there is a promising outline (European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies 2018), and there are beginnings on societal impact (Floridi et al. 2018; Taddeo and 
Floridi 2018; Taylor et al. 2018; Walsh 2018; Bryson 2019; Gibert 2019; SIENNA 2019; Whittlestone 
et al. 2019), sometimes with specific policy recommendations (AI HLEG 2019; IEEE 2019). So this 
article cannot just reproduce what the community has achieved thus far, but must propose an ordering 
where little order exists, including the identification of promising lines for future work – but without 
spending much time on the historical development of the field. 
1.2 AI & Robotics 
The notion of ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI) is understood broadly here, as any kind of artificial 
computational system that shows intelligent behaviour, i.e. complex behaviour that is conducive to 
reaching goals. In particular, we do not wish to restrict ‘intelligence’ to what would require intelligence 
if done by humans, as Minsky said (1985) and is often repeated (Taddeo and Floridi 2018, 751). This 
means we can incorporate machines from ‘technical AI’ that show only limited abilities in learning or 
reasoning but excel at the automation of particular tasks, as well as ‘general AI’ that aims at creating a 
generally intelligent agent. However, AI somehow goes deeper than other technologies since it is the 
project of AI to create machines that have a feature central to how we humans see ourselves, namely as 
feeling, thinking, intelligent beings – thus the field of ‘philosophy of AI’. The main purposes of an 
artificial intelligent agent probably involve sensing, modelling, planning and action, but current AI 
applications also include perception and sensing, text analysis, natural language processing (NLP), 
logical reasoning, game-playing, decision support systems, data analytics, predictive analytics, as well 
as autonomous vehicles and other forms of robotics (P. Stone et al. 2016). AI may involve any number 
of computational techniques to achieve these aims, be that classical symbol-manipulating AI, be it 
inspired by natural cognition, or machine learning via neural networks – the area that currently looks 
most dynamic (Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville 2016; Silver et al. 2018). Some of the ethical issues 
we discuss here apply to the whole field of AI, and some only to sub-fields. 
Historically, it is remarkable that the term “AI” used to be very broad approximately 1950-1980, then it 
came into disrepute during the ‘AI winter’, ca. 1975-1995, and narrowed: ‘machine learning’, ‘natural 
language processing’ and any ‘data science’ were often not labelled as ‘AI’. It is now since, ca. 2010, 
that the use broadened again, and at times almost all of computer science and cognitive science is 
lumped under ‘AI’ – now a name to be proud of, on the edge of hype again, and a booming industry 
with massive capital investment (Shoham et al. 2018) that, as politicians say, “… promises to drive 
growth of the ... economy, enhance our economic and national security, and improve our quality of 
life.” (Trump 2019, 1). 
While AI can be entirely software and data processing, robots are physical machines with actuators that 
move and interact with the environment, that exert physical force on the world, such as a gripper or a 
turning wheel. From this point of view, autonomous cars or planes are robots, and only a minuscule 
portion of robots is human-shaped or ‘humanoid’, like in the movies. Some robots use AI, and some do 
not – e.g. typical industrial robots (of which there are millions) blindly follow completely defined 
scripts with minimal sensory input and no learning or reasoning that would add complexity. It is 
probably fair to say that while robotics systems cause more concerns in the general public, AI systems 
are actually more likely to have a greater impact on humanity. Also, systems with for a narrow set of 
tasks are less likely to cause new issues than systems that are more flexible and autonomous. 
The fields of robotics and AI can thus be seen as two overlapping circles of systems: systems that are 
only AI, systems that are only robotics, and systems that are both. The scope of this article is not just 
the intersection, but the union of both circles.  
1.3 A Note on Policy 
There is significant public discussion about AI ethics and frequent pronouncements from politicians 
that the matter requires new policy – however, this is easier said than done: Actual technology policy is 
difficult to plan and to enforce. Technology policy can take many forms, from incentives and funding, 
infrastructure, taxation, good-will statements, regulation by various actors (self-regulation, local, 
national, international), to law. Policy for AI will possibly come into conflict with other aims of 
technology policy (e.g. sustainable development) or general policy (e.g. economic growth). One 
important practical aspect is which agents are involved in the development of a policy and what the 
power structures are. For people who work in in ethics and policy, there is probably a tendency to 
overestimate the impact and threats from any new technology, and to underestimate how far current 
regulation can reach (e.g. for product liability). Governments, parliaments, associations and industry 
circles in Europe and North-America have produced reports and white papers in recent years (we 
maintain a list on PT-AI Policy Documents and Institutions), some have generated good-will slogans 
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(‘trusted/responsible/humane/human-centred/good/beneficial AI’), but, as of early 2019, very little 
actual policy has been produced – beyond funding for AI, and for AI policy.  
There are beginnings: The latest EU policy document suggests ‘trustworthy AI’ should be lawful, 
ethical and technically robust, and then spells this out as seven requirements: human oversight, 
technical robustness, privacy and data governance, transparency, fairness, well-being and 
accountability (AI HLEG 2019). Much European research now runs under the slogan ‘responsible 
research and innovation’ (RRI) and ‘technology assessment’ is a standard field since the advent of 
nuclear power. Professional ethics is now a standard field in Information Technology as well, and this 
includes issues relevant here (e.g. confidentiality). There is a risk that the current vision statements and 
self-regulation in the industry tend to delegate the decisions to experts, “a narrow circle of who can or 
should adjudicate ethical concerns around AI/ML” (Greene, Hoffmann, and Stark forthcoming), rather 
than incorporating societal stakeholders more deeply. A useful summary of an ethical framework for 
AI is given in (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 2018, 13ff). On general AI 
policy, see (Calo 2018) as well as (Crawford and Calo 2016; Stahl, Timmermans, and Mittelstadt 2016; 
Johnson and Verdicchio 2017; Giubilini and Savulescu 2018).  
On wider societal implications (Jacobs et al. 2019) have useful perspectives. The more political angle 
of technology is often discussed in ‘science and technology studies’ (STS), and sadly rather separated 
from philosophy or ethics. As books like The Ethics of Invention (Jasanoff 2016) show, the concerns 
are often quite similar. In this article, we discuss the theoretical approaches and the policy for each type 
of issue separately, rather than for AI or robotics in general. 
2 Ethics for the Use of AI & Robotics Systems 
In this section we outline the ethical issues of human use of AI and robotics systems that can be more 
or less autonomous – which means we look at issues that arise with certain uses, and would not arise 
with others, though it must be kept in mind that technologies will always cause some uses to be easier 
and thus more frequent, and hinder other uses: the technology is not ethically neutral. The design of 
technical artefacts has ethical relevance for their use as well (Houkes and Vermaas 2010; Verbeek 
2011), so beyond ‘responsible use’, we also need ‘responsible research and innovation’ in this field. 
There are authors, however, who prefer to see the ethics of AI and robotics generally from the 
perspective of machine ethics, rather than from the perspective of use – e.g. (Dignum 2018) suggests 
the field is about three things: ethics by design, ethics in design, and ethics for design. This also 
stresses the need to look at different stages of the systems’ life cycle. 
We will discuss both what is ethically permitted (or not) and what is ethically required (or not). The 
focus on use does not pre-judge what kinds of approaches are best suited towards tackling these issues; 
they might well be virtue ethics (Vallor 2017) rather than consequentialist or value-based (Floridi et al. 
2018). This section is neutral with respect to the question whether AI systems truly have ‘intelligence’ 
or other mental properties: It would apply equally well if AI and robotics are merely seen as the current 
face of automation. Useful surveys for the ethics of robotics include (Calo, Froomkin, and Kerr 2016; 
Royakkers and van Est 2016; Lin, Abney, and Jenkins 2017) on robot law and (Tzafestas 2016), with a 
chapter on the cultural background of robot ethics in Japan. 
2.1 Privacy, Surveillance & Manipulation 
2.1.1 Privacy & Surveillance 
There is a general discussion about privacy and surveillance, which is largely independent of AI 
technology (e.g. Macnish 2017; Roessler 2017), and mainly concerns the access to private data and 
data that is personally identifiable. Privacy has several well recognised aspects, e.g. ‘the right to be let 
alone’, information privacy, privacy as an aspect of personhood, control over information about me, 
right to secrecy (Bennett and Raab 2006). Privacy studies have historically focused on state 
surveillance by secret services, which has significantly increased in the digital age (some of US state 
surveillance became more widely known with the ‘Snowden revelations’ in 2013). State surveillance 
still continues with many states comprehensively spying on communication and location metadata of 
their own citizens, and on communication and location data of citizens of other states – and then 
sometimes exchanging that information with the state of that citizen (e.g. in the ‘five eyes’ network: 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA). Generally data collection and storage is now 
all digital, our lives are more and more digital, most digital data is connected to a single Internet, and 
there is more and more sensor technology around that generates data (sound, video, movement, 
temperature, …). Every new AI technology amplifies the known issues, e.g. face recognition in photos 
and surveillance material allows identification and thus profiling and searching for individuals 
(Whittaker et al. 2018, 15ff). AI massively increases the possibilities of intelligent data collection and 
surveillance, and the possibilities for data analysis and for finding patterns. This increase applies to 
state agents, but increasingly to private businesses as well – some corporations, such as Google, 
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Microsoft or Facebook, have a fairly complete access to individual and network data. Businesses and 
individuals also trade data from various sources with anyone who will pay, including the police. At the 
same time, the control over who collects which data, and who has access, is much harder in the digital 
world than it was in the analogue world of letters and telephone calls. 
Robotic devices have not yet played a major role in this area, except for security patrolling, but this 
will change once they are more common outside industry. Robotic devices together with the ‘Internet 
of things’, the so-called ‘smart’ systems (phone, TV, oven, lamp, home, …), the ‘smart city’ (Sennett 
2018) and ‘smart governance’, are set to become part of the data-gathering machinery that offers more 
detailed data, of different types, in real time, with ever more information – to whomever has access. 
It is clear that these systems will often reveal facts about humans that we themselves wish to suppress 
or are not aware of: They know more about us than we know ourselves. Even just observing online 
behaviour allows insights into our mental states (Burr and Christianini forthcoming) and manipulation 
(see below (2.1.2)), which has led to calls for protection of inferences or ‘derived data’ (Wachter and 
Mittelstadt forthcoming). With the last sentence of his bestselling book (Harari 2016) asks about what 
he thinks of as long-term consequences of AI: “What will happen to society, politics and daily life 
when non-conscious but highly intelligent algorithms know us better than we know ourselves?” 
Privacy-preserving techniques who can conceal the identity of persons or groups to a large extent are 
now a standard staple in data science; they include (relative) anonymisation, access control (plus 
encryption), differential privacy and other models where computation is carried out without access to 
full non-encrypted input data (Stahl and Wright 2018). With more effort and cost, such techniques can 
avoid many of the privacy issues, though probably not all, and once the data has been collected and 
stored, the problem remains. Some companies, notably Apple, have also seen better privacy as a 
competitive advantage that can be leveraged and sold at a price to their consumers. 
Data analysis is often used in ‘predictive analytics’ in business, healthcare and other fields, to foresee 
future developments. One such use is in ‘predictive policing’ (Programs 2014), which many fear might 
lead to an erosion of public liberties (Ferguson 2017) because ‘predictive analytics’ can give power to 
people using it, and take away power from the predicted. It appears, however, that the worries about 
policing lives to some extent off futuristic scenarios where law enforcement foresees and punishes 
planned actions, rather than waiting until a crime has been committed (like in the 2002 film ‘Minority 
Report’). One concern is that these systems might perpetuate bias that was already in the data used to 
set up the system, e.g. by increasing the level of control of a particular population and then finding 
more crime in that population (for such issues, see 2.2 below). Actual ‘predictive policing’ or 
‘intelligence led policing’ techniques mainly concern the question of how police forces are most 
efficiently applied by predicting where they will be needed, who or what should be controlled – which 
is something an experienced police force will have done to some extent. Also, police officers can be 
provided with more data that allows more control and better decisions in workflow support software 
(e.g. ‘ArcGIS’). Whether this is problematic depends on the appropriate level of trust in the technical 
quality of these systems, and on the evaluation of aims of the police work. Perhaps a recent paper title 
points in the right direction: “AI ethics in predictive policing: From models of threat to an ethics of 
care” (Asaro 2019). 
Legally, one of the major difficulties is to actually enforce regulation, both on the level of the state and 
on the level of the individual who has a claim – but must identify the responsible legal entity, prove the 
action, perhaps prove intent, find a court that declares itself competent … and eventually get the court 
to actually enforce its decision. Well-established legal protection of rights such as consumer rights, 
product liability and other civil liability or protection of intellectual property rights is often missing in 
digital products, or hard to enforce. This means that companies with a ‘digital’ background are used to 
testing their products on the consumers, without fear of liability, while heavily defending their 
intellectual property rights. This ‘Internet Libertarianism’ is sometimes taken to assume that technical 
solutions will take care of societal problems by themselves (Mozorov 2013). 
The policy and regulation in these areas in favour of civil liberties and protection of individuals is 
under very intense pressure from businesses lobbying, from secret services and other state agencies that 
live off surveillance (see the next section). As a result, privacy protection has diminished massively as 
compared to the pre-digital age where communication was based on letters, analogue telephone 
communications, and personal conversation – and surveillance involved individual people ‘listening 
in’, usually under significant legal constraints. It is probably fair to say that as individuals and groups 
we have lost control of our data, and thus perhaps of ourselves (see the next section). 
2.1.2 Manipulation of Behaviour 
Manipulation of online behaviour is probably a core way of doing business on the Internet at the 
moment. The data trail we leave behind is how our ‘free’ services are paid for, enabled by AI for the 
analysis or ‘valuation’ of that data – but we are not told about that data collection and its value, and we 
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are manipulated into leaving ever more such data. The primary focus of social media, gaming, and 
most of the Internet in this ‘surveillance economy’ is to gain, maintain and direct attention – and thus 
data supply. Essentially, this is a surveillance and attention economy: “Surveillance is the business 
model of the Internet” (Schneier 2015) and its economic system is “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 
2019). The result is that “In this vast ocean of data, there is a frighteningly complete picture of us” 
(Smolan 2016, 1:01). This business model of corporations like Google or Facebook appears to be based 
on exploiting human weaknesses, deception, furthering procrastination, generating addiction, and 
manipulation (Harris 2016) – despite several claims to the contrary. Surveillance capitalism has caused 
many attempts to escape from the grasp of the ‘big 5’ (Amazon, Google/Alphabet, Microsoft, Apple, 
Facebook) or ‘social media’, e.g. in exercises of digital chastity or ‘minimalism’ (Newport 2019), or 
through the open source movement, but it appears that present-day computer users have lost their 
autonomy to escape from the ‘big 5’ while continuing with their life and work. We may also have lost 
ownership of our data, if ‘ownership’ is the right relation here. 
The issues of AI in surveillance go beyond the mere accumulation of data and direction of attention: 
They include the use of information to manipulate behaviour, online and offline, in a way that 
undermines autonomous rational choice. Of course efforts to manipulate behaviour are ancient, but it 
may be that these gain a new quality in AI systems based on big-data analytics. 
Given the intense interaction with data systems and the deep knowledge about individuals, the users are 
vulnerable to ‘nudges’, manipulation and deception. Given sufficient prior data, algorithms can be used 
to provide individuals or small groups with the kind of targeted input that is likely to influence these 
particular individuals.  
Predictably, advertisers, marketers and online sellers will use any legal means at their disposal to make 
us part with more of our money, including exploitation of behavioural biases and deception (Costa and 
Halpern 2019) – e.g. through ‘dark patterns’ on web pages or in games (Mathur et al. 2019). Such 
manipulation is the business model in much of the gambling and gaming industries, but it is spreading, 
e.g. to low-cost airlines and, ultimately, maximum profit is the aim (or a central aim) of businesses like 
the ‘big 5’. 
Furthermore, social media are now the prime locations for political propaganda, both in more 
democratic systems and in less democratic ones. This influence can be used to influence voting 
behaviour, as in the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica ‘scandal’ (Woolley and Howard 2017; Bradshaw, 
Neudert, and Howard 2019) and it may harm the autonomy of individuals (Susser, Roessler, and 
Nissenbaum 2019). 
Furthermore, improved AI faking technologies make what once was reliable evidence into unreliable 
evidence – this has already happened to digital photos, sound recordings and video … and it will soon 
be quite easy to create (rather than alter) ‘deep fake’ text, photos and video material with any content. 
OpenAI showed a similarity text creator GPT-2 early in 2019 but refrained from opening its code. (A 
simple version of this phenomenon are machine-driven Twitter accounts, some imitating actually 
existing people.) Soon, sophisticated real-time interaction with persons over texting, phone or video 
will be faked, too. So we cannot trust any digital interaction, while we are at the same time increasingly 
dependent on such interaction. 
One more specific issue is that so-called ‘machine learning’ techniques in AI rely on training with vast 
amounts of data, so their performance requires that such data is available. This means there will often 
be a trade-off between privacy and rights to data vs. technical quality of the product. This influences 
the consequentialist evaluation of privacy-violating practices: Better data for higher quality training is 
available if privacy is reduced – though there may be other ways to achieve high-quality data sets, with 
more effort. 
The policy in this field has its ups and downs; while the EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (EU Parliament 2016) has strengthened privacy protection, the US and China prefer growth 
with less regulation (N. Thompson and Bremmer 2018), likely in the hope that this gives them a 
competitive advantage in machine learning technologies that require very large data sets. It is clear that 
state, business and private actors have increased their ability to invade privacy with the help of AI 
technology and will continue to do so to further their particular interests – unless reined in by policy in 
the interest of society. (The UK has launched a “Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation Consultation” 
late in 2018.) Public control of state and private actors in this area is still minimal. 
2.2 Our Epistemic Condition: Opacity and Bias 
Automated AI decision support systems and ‘predictive analytics’ operate on data and produce a 
decision as ‘output’. This output may be relatively trivial like “this restaurant matches your 
preferences”, “the patient in this X-ray has completed bone growth”, or have greater significance for a 
person, e.g. if it says “application to credit card declined”, “donor organ will be given to another 
patient”, “bail is denied”, or “target identified and engaged”. These systems raise “significant concerns 
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about lack of due process, accountability, community engagement, and auditing” (Whittaker et al. 
2018, 18ff). They are are part of a power structure where “we are creating decision-making processes 
that constrain and limit opportunities for human participation” (Danaher 2016b, 245). 
At the same time, it will often be impossible for the affected person to know how the system came to 
this output, i.e. the system is ‘opaque’ to the person. If the system involves machine learning, it will 
typically be opaque even to the expert how a particular pattern was identified, or even what the pattern 
is. Furthermore, the decision system might have a bias and produce unfair decisions. Bias in decision 
systems and data sets is exacerbated by these sets and systems not being epistemically readily 
accessible, or ‘opaque’. So, at least in the cases where there is a desire to remove bias, the analysis of 
opacity and bias has to go hand in hand, and the political response has to tackle both issues together.  
2.2.1 Opacity of AI Systems 
Many AI systems rely on machine learning techniques in (simulated) neural networks that will extract 
patterns from a given dataset, with or without ‘correct’ solutions provided, i.e. supervised, semi-
supervised or unsupervised. With these techniques, the ‘learning’ captures patterns in the data and 
these are labelled in a way that appears useful to the programmer (e.g. “male” or “insecure”) while the 
programmer does not really know which patterns in the data the system has used. In fact the programs 
are evolving, so when new data comes in, or new feedback is given (“this was correct”, “this was 
incorrect”), the patterns used by the learning system change – depending on the type of machine 
learning system. What this means is that the outcome cannot really be explained, it is not transparent to 
the user or programmers, it is opaque. Furthermore, the quality of the program depends heavily on the 
quality of the data provided, following the old slogan “garbage in, garbage out”. So, if the data already 
involved a bias (e.g. police data about the skin colour of suspects, or job data including gender), then 
the program will reproduce that bias. There are proposals for a standard description of datasets in a 
‘datasheet’ that would make the identification of such bias more feasible (Gebru et al. 2018). There is a 
significant recent literature about the limitations of machine learning systems (Marcus 2018), that are 
essentially sophisticated data filters. This technology is likely at the peak of the ‘hype cycle’ at the 
moment. Opacity is a central issue in what is now often called ‘data ethics’ (Floridi and Taddeo 2016; 
Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016), particularly in the ethics of big data – whether AI is used there, or not. 
In the EU, some of these issues have been taken into account with the GDPR, which foresees that 
consumers who are faced with a decision based on data processing (e.g. on a loan application) have a 
legal “right to explanation” – how far this goes and to what extent it can be enforced is disputed, 
however (Goodman and Flaxman 2016; Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi 2017; Wachter, Mittelstadt, 
and Russell 2018). How far ‘explicability’ should go is an open question, given that the abilities of 
humans to explain and provide reasons are not too impressive - (Zerilli et al. forthcoming) argue there 
may be a double standard here where we demand too much of machine-based decisions.  
There are several technical activities that aim at ‘explainable AI’, starting with (Van Lent, Fisher, and 
Mancuso 1999; Lomas et al. 2012) and, more recently, a DARPA programme (Gunning 2018) and the 
AI4EU project on ‘human-centred AI’. More broadly, the demand for “a mechanism for elucidating 
and articulating the power structures, biases, and influences that computational artefacts exercise in 
society” (Diakopoulos 2015) is sometimes called “algorithmic accountability reporting”. This does not 
mean that we expect an AI to ‘explain its reasoning’ – doing so would require far more serious moral 
autonomy than we currently attribute to AI systems (see below 3.2). 
Kissinger pointed out that there is a fundamental problem for democratic decision-making if we rely on 
a system that is supposedly superior to mere humans, but cannot explain its decisions. He says we may 
have “generated a potentially dominating technology in search of a guiding philosophy“ (Kissinger 
2018). (Danaher 2016b) calls this problem the ‘algocracy’. In a similar vein, (Cave 2019) stresses that 
we need a broader societal move towards more ‘democratic’ decision-making to avoid AI being a force 
that leads to a Kafka-style impenetrable suppression system in public administration and elsewhere. 
This general political angle of this discussion has been stressed by (O’Neil 2016) in her influential 
book Weapons of Math Destruction, and in (Yeung and Lodge 2019). 
2.2.2 Bias in Decision Systems 
Bias typically surfaces when unfair judgments are made because the individual making the judgment is 
influenced by a characteristic that is actually irrelevant to matter at hand, typically a discriminatory 
preconception about members of a group; e.g. they have a tendency underestimate a person’s 
intellectual ability due to information about gender or skin colour. So the first form of bias is a 
cognitive feature of a person, learned in a particular social context at a particular time. It is often not 
make explicit and at times the person concerned is not conscious of having that bias – they may even 
be honestly and explicitly opposed to a bias they are found to have (e.g. through priming, cf. (Graham 
and Lowery 2004)). In some jurisdictions there are ‘protected characteristics’ that may not be used for 
distinction at all, i.e. their use is always considered discrimination (unless there is a specified exception 
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in the law) – in the (UK Equality Act 2010) these would be: age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy or maternity, race (including colour, nationality, ethnic or 
national origin), religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation. This can lead to problems, e.g. when an 
insurance company finds out that these characteristics are predictive of higher risk for causing car 
accidents. On fairness vs. bias in machine learning, see (Binns 2018). 
Apart from the social phenomenon of learned bias, the human cognitive system is generally prone to 
have various kinds of ‘cognitive biases’ (a 2ND form), e.g. the ‘confirmation bias’ where humans tend 
to interpret information as confirming what they already believe. Cognitive biases are said to impede 
performance in rational judgment (Kahnemann 2011) – though at least some cognitive biases generate 
an evolutionary advantage, e.g. economical use of resources for intuitive judgment. There is a question 
whether AI systems could or should have such cognitive bias. 
A third form is bias in present in data, when it exhibits systematic error, e.g. one of the various kinds of 
‘statistical bias’. Sometimes, it can be detected automatically in human language corpora (Caliskan, 
Bryson, and Narayanan 2017). Strictly, any given dataset will only be unbiased for a particular kind of 
issue, so the mere creation of a dataset involves the danger that it be used for a different kind of issue, 
and then turn out biased for that kind. AI systems are often used to create such data, e.g. in the 
selection of news displayed to a particular user, creating a ‘filter bubble’. Machine learning uses 
datasets for training and testing that are often parts of the same larger set, meaning they might carry the 
same bias – we might call this ‘historical bias’. Bias can thus be present but unknown, which makes it 
harder to fight. Automation on the basis of such data would then just not fix the bias, but codify and 
automate the bias.  
The fourth type of bias would thus be an AI decision system that has a cognitive feature similar to a 
biased human (be this due to learning from biased data or from other sources); this is sometimes called 
‘algorithmic bias’. This is difficult to avoid in backwards-looking machine learning systems because 
they can only learn from the past. Such historical bias was discovered in an automated recruitment 
screening system at Amazon (discontinued early 2017) that discriminated against women – presumably 
because the company had a history of hiring women less frequently than they occurred in the applicant 
pool. Historical bias can also be an issue in ‘predictive policing’, see section (2.1.1). For example, 
COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions), a system to predict 
whether a defendant would re-offend, was found to be as successful (65.2% accuracy) as a group of 
random humans, or a simple linear predictor (Dressel and Farid 2018). Both COMPAS and the human 
group produced more false positives and less false negatives for black defendants. The problem with 
such systems is thus bias and excessive/insufficient trust. Such bias can then be reinforced, e.g. if black 
suspects are controlled by police more often for some offence, and are thus more likely to be found 
actually guilty of that offence. The political dimensions of such automated systems in the USA are 
investigated in (Eubanks 2018). 
There are significant technical efforts made to detect and remove bias from AI systems, but it is fair to 
say that these are in early stages: see UK Institute for Ethical AI & Machine Learning, (Brownsword, 
Scotford, and Yeung 2017; Yeung and Lodge 2019). It appears that technological fixes have their 
limits in that they need a mathematical notion of fairness, which is hard to come by (Whittaker et al. 
2018, 24ff; Selbst et al. 2019); as is a formal notion of ‘race’ (see Benthall and Haynes 2019). An 
institutional proposal is in (Veale and Binns 2017). 
2.3 Interaction with Machines 
Human robot interaction (HRI) and generally the interaction with machines are now academic fields in 
their own right. There is now significant attention to ethical matters in HRI, the dynamics of perception 
from both sides, the different interests and the intricacy of the social context, including co-working 
with robots (e.g. Arnold and Scheutz 2017). 
2.3.1 Deception & Authenticity 
While AI, with robots or without, can be used to manipulate humans into believing and doing things, it 
can also be used to drive robots that are problematic since they involve deception, or perhaps violate 
human dignity or the Kantian requirement of ‘respect for humanity’ (Lin, Abney, and Jenkins 2017). 
Humans very easily attribute mental properties to objects, and empathise with them, especially when 
their outer appearance is similar to living beings. This can be used to deceive humans (or animals) into 
attributing more intellectual or even emotional significance to robots or AI systems than they deserve. 
For this reason, some parts of humanoid robotics are problematic and there are cases, with a focus on 
being as lifelike as possible, that have been clearly deceptive for public-relations purposes (e.g. Hanson 
Robotics’ “Sophia”), and others that hover on the edge (e.g. Hiroshi Ishiguro’s remote-controlled 
Geminoids). At times users are made to believe they interact with a person, where they are not. 
However, some fairly basic constraints of business ethics and law apply to robots, too: product safety 
and liability, or non-deception in advertisement. It appears that these existing laws take care of many 
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‘concerns’ that are raised. There are cases, however, where human-human interaction has aspects that 
appear specifically human in ways that can perhaps not be replaced by robots, even if deception is not 
at play: care, love and sex. 
2.3.2 Example a) Care Robots 
The use of robots in health care for humans is currently at the level of concept studies in real 
environments, but it may become a usable technology in a few years, and has raised a number of 
concerns for a dystopian future of de-humanised care (A. Sharkey and Sharkey 2011; Robert Sparrow 
2016). This involves robots that support human carers [caregivers] e.g. in lifting patients, or 
transporting material, robots that enable patients to do certain things by themselves (e.g. eat with a 
robotic arm), but also robots that are given to patients as company and comfort (e.g. the ‘Paro’ robot 
seal). For an overview, see (van Wynsberghe 2016; Nørskov 2017; Fosch-Villaronga and Albo-Canals 
2019), for a survey of users (Draper et al. 2014). 
One reason why the issue of care has come to the fore is that people have argued we need (humanoid) 
robots in ageing societies to care for the elderly. This argument makes dubious assumptions, namely 
that with longer lifespan people will need more care, and that it will not be possible to attract more 
humans to caring professions. It may also show a bias about age (Jecker forthcoming). Most 
importantly, it ignores the nature of automation, which is not simply about replacing humans, but about 
allowing humans to work more efficiently. In fact much of the use of robots in people who need care 
will not be to support or replace carers, but to enable such people to perform the actions for which they 
needed others, e.g. walk, eat, wash, or just pick up something from the floor. 
It is not very clear that there really is an issue here, since the discussion mostly focuses on the fear of 
robots de-humanising care, but the actual and foreseeable robots in care are for classic automation of 
technical tasks as assistive robots (lifting patients, carrying medicine and supplies). They are thus ‘care 
robots’ in a behavioural sense of doing what is required, not in sense that a human cares for the patients 
and the ‘cared for’ recognises this intention. It appears that the success of ‘being cared for’ relies on 
this intentional sense of ‘care’, which foreseeable robots cannot provide. If anything, the risk of robots 
in care is the absence of care – because human carers may be needed less. Interestingly, caring for 
something, even a virtual agent, can be good for the carer themselves (Lee et al. 2019). 
A system that pretends to care would be deceptive and thus problematic – unless the deception is 
countered by sufficiently large utility gain (Coeckelbergh 2016). Some robots that pretend to ‘care’ on 
a basic level are available (Paro seal) and others are in the making. There is a question whether these 
should always be worse than a bad situation in a care home. Perhaps feeling cared for by a machine, to 
some extent, can be progress in some cases – but in those cases should we go for the ‘robotic’ path of 
progress? 
2.3.3 Example b) Sex Robots 
It has been argued by several tech optimists that humans will likely be interested in sex and 
companionship with robots and feel good about it (Levy 2007) – this idea has inspired several movies. 
Given the variation of human sexual preferences, including sex toys and sex dolls, this seems very 
likely: The question is whether such devices should be manufactured and promoted, and whether there 
should be limits to use in this murky area. It has been mostly ignored for a long time, but seems to have 
moved into the mainstream of ‘robot philosophy’ in recent times (Sullins 2012; Danaher and McArthur 
2017; N. Sharkey et al. 2017; Bendel 2018; Devlin 2018). 
Humans have long had deep emotional attachments to objects, so perhaps companionship or even love 
with a predictable android is attractive to some people, especially those that struggle with actual 
humans, and already prefer dogs, cats, a bird, a computer or a tamagotchi. Danaher (forthcoming-b) 
argues against (Nyholm and Frank 2017) that this can be true friendship, and thus is a valuable goal. It 
certainly looks like such friendship might increase overall utility, even if lacking in depth. In all this 
area there is an issue of deception, since a robot cannot (at present) mean what it says, or have feelings 
for a human – so any expressions of this sort may be deceptive for some users. It is well known that 
humans are prone to attribute feelings and thoughts to entities that behave as if they had sentience, and 
even to clearly inanimate objects that show no behaviour at all. Also, paying for deception seems to be 
an elementary part of the traditional sex industry. 
Finally, there are concerns that have often accompanied matters of sex, namely consent (Frank and 
Nyholm 2017), aesthetic concerns and the worry that humans may be ‘corrupted’ by certain 
experiences. Old fashioned though this may seem, human behaviour is influenced by experience, and it 
is likely that pornography or sex robots support the perception of other humans as mere objects of 
desire, or even as recipients of abuse, and thus ruin a deeper sexual and erotic experience. The 
‘Campaign Against Sex Robots’ argues that these devices are a continuation of slavery and prostitution 
and further abuse of humans (Richardson 2017). 
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2.4 The Effects of Automation on Employment 
Industrial automation typically means that individual productivity of human workers is increased, and 
thus fewer humans are required for the same output. Classic automation replaced human muscle; digital 
automation replaces human thought or information-processing – and unlike physical machines digital 
automation is cheap to duplicate (Bostrom and Yudkovski 2014). Automation does not necessarily 
mean a loss of overall employment, however, because demand can also increase because the available 
wealth increased. The attempt to increase productivity has probably always been a feature of the 
economy, though the emphasis on ‘growth’ is a modern phenomenon (Harari 2016, 240). In the long 
run, higher productivity has led to more wealth and more employment overall. Major labour market 
disruptions have occurred in the past, e.g. farming employed over 60% of the workforce in Europe and 
North-America in 1800, while by 2010 it employed ca. 5% in the EU, even less in the wealthiest 
countries (Anonymous 2013). Between 1950 and 1970 the number of hired agricultural workers in the 
UK halved (Zayed and Loft 2019). 
In the meantime new jobs and new kinds of jobs have been created and overall wealth increased. The 
main question is: Is it different, this time? Will the creation of new jobs keep up with the destruction? 
And even if it is not different, what are the transition costs, and who bears them? Do we need to make 
societal adjustments for a fair distribution of costs and benefits of automation? 
Responses to the issue of unemployment from AI have ranged from the alarmed (Frey and Osborne 
2013; Westlake 2014) to the neutral (Metcalf, Keller, and Boyd 2016; Calo 2018) and the optimistic 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2016; Harari 2016; Danaher forthcoming-a) – though there is agreement 
that very significant disruption is likely. In principle, the labour market effect of automation seems to 
be fairly well understood as involving two channels: “(i) the nature of interactions between differently 
skilled workers and new technologies affecting labour demand and (ii) the equilibrium effects of 
technological progress through consequent changes in labour supply and product markets.” (Goos 
2018, 362). And what currently seems to happen in the labour market as a result of AI & robotics 
automation of information skills is ‘job polarisation’ or the ‘dumbbell’ shape (Goos, Manning, and 
Salomons 2009): The highly skilled technical jobs are in demand and highly paid, the low skilled 
service jobs are in demand and badly paid, but the mid-qualification jobs in factories and offices, i.e. 
the majority of jobs, are under pressure and reduced because they are relatively predictable, and most 
likely to be automated (Baldwin 2019). Whether AI will ultimately drive unemployment will depend 
both on technical development and on the societal response. 
It is not surprising that new technologies will be used to continue unfair economic practices that are 
available, e.g. excessively cheap human labour in the ‘crowd’ (Whittaker et al. 2018, 34ff) or other 
forms of classical capitalist exploitation. – On the other hand, perhaps due to enormous productivity 
gains, the ‘age of leisure’ can at last be realised, as (Keynes 1930) had predicted to occur around 2030 
at a growth rate of 1% per annum? Actually, we have reached the level he anticipated for 2030, but we 
are still working – and consuming more. Harari explains how this economical development allowed 
humanity to overcome hunger disease and war – and now we aim for immortality and eternal bliss 
through AI (Harari 2016, 75 etc.), a project that he thinks is doomed to lead to the irrelevance of 
humanity. 
In general terms, this issue concerns how goods in a society should be justly distributed, or ‘distributive 
justice’. A standard view is that the principles of justice should be rationally decided from behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls 1971), i.e. as if one does not know what position in a society one would 
actually take (labourer or industrialist, etc.). What follows from this is less obvious, though Rawls 
thought the chosen principles would support basic liberties and a distribution that is of greatest benefit 
to the least-advantaged members of society. In any case, some kind of fair distribution is envisaged that 
goes beyond just accepting a distribution that was produced by the current socioeconomic forces. It 
would appear that the AI economy has two features that contradict such justice: First, it operates in a 
largely unregulated environment where responsibility is often hard to allocate (which may deteriorate 
into Hobbes’ “state of nature”). Second, it operates in markets that have a ‘winner takes all’ feature 
where monopolies develop quickly. This second feature harks back to the first, since monopolies are 
typically regulated. 
The question thus is how the additional wealth is distributed, and whether this can be left to free market 
forces. What are the societal factors and agents that need to be involved? – Again, a question that has 
been asked with other forms of automation. It is made harder by the move to a ‘new economy’ with the 
digital service industry, especially platforms like Google or Facebook, based on intangible assets, also 
called ‘capitalism without capital’ (Haskel and Westlake 2017). This has many challenges, of which 
unemployment is just one: Perhaps more prominent are monopolies and the difficulty of traditional 
policy to control multinational digital corporations that do not rely on physical plant in a particular 
location. Generally, the benefits and disadvantages of AI & robotics technologies will be broad and we 
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will need to see in each area how to fairly distribute these, e.g. influences on the natural environment, 
on the workplace, on landscapes and cityscapes, on healthcare, on information, etc. etc. 
2.5 Autonomous Systems 
2.5.1 Autonomy Generally 
There are several notions of autonomy in the discussion. A stronger notion of self-governing 
‘autonomy’ is involved in philosophical discussions, where autonomy is the basis for responsibility and 
personhood (Christman 2018). In this context, responsibility implies autonomy, but responsibility is the 
more narrow and more demanding notion, so there can be systems that have degrees of technical 
autonomy without raising issues of responsibility. While some systems will raise issues of 
responsibility due to increased autonomy, there may be reasons other than responsibility for raising 
these issues, e.g. the absence of an identifiable individual agent that is stable over time. The weaker, 
more technical, notion of autonomy in robotics is relative and gradual: A system is said to be 
autonomous with respect to human control to a certain degree (Müller 2012). There is a parallel here to 
the issues of bias and opacity in AI since autonomy also concerns a power-relation: who is in control, 
and who is responsible. It is not just the user, so who or what is it? 
Generally speaking, one question is whether autonomous robots raise issues that suggest a revision of 
present conceptual schemes, or whether they just require technical adjustments to what we already 
have. In most jurisdictions, there is a sophisticated system of civil and criminal liability, in particular 
product liability, which may resolve some of the issues. Technical standards, e.g. for the safe use of 
machinery in medical environments, or for product audits and other forms of regulatory compliance, 
will likely need to be adjusted, but perhaps not overthrown by fundamental problems. There is already 
a field of ‘verifiable AI’ for such safety-critical systems, and for ‘security applications’. Bodies like the 
IEEE and the BSI have produced ‘standards’, particularly on more technical sub-problems, such as data 
security and transparency. Among the many autonomous systems on land, on water, under water, in the 
air or in space, we discuss two samples: autonomous vehicles and autonomous weapons. 
Autonomous systems are discussed here under the assumption that they are used by humans and the 
responsibility remains with the users or makers – if the autonomy is strong enough to raise the issue 
whether the robots themselves are responsible for their actions then the matter is discussed in section 
3.2 ‘Artificial Moral Agents’. 
2.5.2 Example a) Autonomous Vehicles 
Autonomous vehicles hold the promise to reduce the very significant damage that driving currently 
causes – with approximately 1 million humans being killed per year, many more injured, the 
environment polluted, earth sealed with concrete and tarmac, cities full of parked cars, etc. etc. 
However, there seem to be questions on how autonomous vehicles should behave, and how 
responsibility and risk should be distributed in the complicated system of autonomous vehicle and 
traffic control. (There is also significant disagreement over how long the development of fully 
autonomous, or ‘level 5’, cars will actually take. These would be cars that can replace the human driver 
entirely (SAE 2015). 
In the classic ‘trolley problems’ (J. J. Thompson 1976; Woollard and Howard-Snyder 2016, section 2) 
various dilemmas are presented, the simplest version is that of a trolley train on a track that is heading 
towards five people and will kill them, unless the train is diverted onto a side track, but on that track 
there is one person, who will be killed if this choice is made. The example goes back to a remark in 
(Foot 1967, 6), who discusses a number of dilemma cases where tolerated and indented consequences 
of an action differ. The ‘trolley problems’ are not supposed to describe actual ethical problems or to be 
solved with a ‘right’ choice. They are thought experiments where choice is artificially constrained to a 
small finite number of distinct one-off options and the agents has perfect knowledge. These problems 
are used as a theoretical tool to investigate ethical intuitions and theories – especially the difference 
between actively doing vs. allowing something to happen, intended vs. tolerated consequences, and 
consequentialist vs. other normative approaches (Kamm and Rakowski 2016). As such they are often 
used in teaching introductory ethics.  
This type of problem has reminded many of the problems encountered in actual driving, and in 
autonomous driving (Lin 2015). It is doubtful, however, that an actual driver or autonomous car will 
ever have to solve trolley problems (but see Keeling forthcoming). While autonomous car trolley 
problems have received a lot of media attention (Awad et al. 2018), they do not seem to offer anything 
new to either ethical theory or to the programming of autonomous vehicles, beyond a useful ‘intuition 
pump’.  
The more common ethical problems in driving, such as speeding, risky overtaking, not keeping a safe 
distance, not making space for emergency vehicles, etc. etc. are classic problems of pursuing personal 
interest vs. the common good. The vast majority of these are also covered by legal regulations on 
Vincent C. Müller – ‘Ethics of AI & Robotics’ for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
– vs. 0.96 – public draft, http://www.sophia.de - 03.10.2019 12 
driving, so programming the car to drive ‘by the rules’ rather than ‘by the interest of the passengers’ or 
‘to achieve maximum utility’ is deflated to a standard problem of programming ethical machines (see 
section 3.1). There are probably additional discretionary rules of politeness, e.g. on allowing others to 
join a priority road, allowing large vehicles more space than they officially deserve, or giving way to 
driving errors by weaker participants in traffic. What might be more interesting is when to break the 
rules, e.g. to avoid an accident (Lin 2015), but again this seems to be more a case of applying standard 
considerations for driving (rules vs. utility) to the case of autonomous vehicles.  
Notable policy efforts in this field include the report (German Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure 2017), which stresses that safety is the primary objective and accountability 
cannot remain with the ‘driver’. Rule 10 states “In the case of automated and connected driving 
systems, the accountability that was previously the sole preserve of the individual shifts from the 
motorist to the manufacturers and operators of the technological systems and to the bodies responsible 
for taking infrastructure, policy and legal decisions.” (See below (3.2.1).) The resulting German and 
EU laws on licensing automated driving are much more restrictive than their US counterparts where 
‘testing on consumers’ is a strategy used by some companies – without informed consent of the 
consumers or their possible victims. 
2.5.3 Example b) Autonomous Weapons 
The notion of automated weapons is fairly old: “For example, instead of fielding simple guided 
missiles or remotely piloted vehicles, we might launch completely autonomous land, sea, and air 
vehicles capable of complex, far-ranging reconnaissance and attack missions.” (DARPA 1983, 1). This 
proposal was ridiculed as ‘fantasy’ at the time (Dreyfus, Dreyfus, and Athanasiou 1986, ix), but it is 
now a reality, at least for more easily identifiable targets (missiles, planes, ships, tanks, etc.), but not 
for human combatants that must be distinguished from civilians. The main arguments against (lethal) 
autonomous weapon systems (AWS or LAWS), are that they support extrajudicial killings, take 
responsibility away from humans, and make wars or killings more likely – for a detailed list of issues 
see (Lin, Bekey, and Abney 2008, 73-86). 
One particular concern is whether autonomous weapons would make wars, or violence short of war 
more likely. Lowering the hurdle to use such systems (autonomous vehicles, ‘fire-and-forget’ missiles, 
or drones loaded with explosives) and reducing the probability of being held accountable would 
increase the probability of their use. One threat that is easy to imagine be a small drone that searches, 
identifies, pursues and kills an individual human – or perhaps a type of human. The same threat on a 
larger scale would be conventional cruise missiles to identify and attack targets autonomously. It is also 
said that autonomous weapons “could wreak havoc in densely populated areas” (Scientific American 
2019). These are the kinds of cases brought forward by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 
(https://www.stopkillerrobots.org) and other activist groups. Some seem to be equivalent to saying that 
autonomous weapons are weapons – weapons kill, weapons of mass-destruction kill many people at 
once, but we still make them in gigantic numbers. Perhaps the arguments are arguments against 
weapons rather than against autonomy in weapons? On the matter of accountability, autonomous 
weapons might make identification and prosecution of the responsible agents more difficult – but this is 
not clear, given the digital records that one can keep, at least in a conventional war. Also the greater 
precision of autonomous weapons may save civilian lives. The crucial asymmetry where one side can 
kill with impunity already exists in conventional drone wars with remote controlled weapons (e.g. US 
in Pakistan).  
Another crucial question seems to be whether using autonomous weapons in war would make wars 
worse, or perhaps reduce human suffering overall and make wars less bad? If robots reduce war crimes 
and crimes in war, the answer may well be positive and has been used as an argument in favour of 
these weapons (Arkin 2009; Müller 2016a) but also as an argument against (Amoroso and Tamburrini 
2018). Arguably the main threat is not the use of such weapons in conventional warfare, but in 
asymmetric conflicts or by non-state agents, including criminals.  
It has also been said that autonomous weapons cannot conform to International Humanitarian Law, 
which requires observance of the principles of distinction (between combatants and civilians), 
proportionality (of force) and military necessity (of force) in military conflict (A. Sharkey 2019). It is 
true that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is hard, but the distinction between 
civilian and military ships is easy – so all this says is that we should not construct and use such 
weapons if they violate Humanitarian Law. A few concerns have been raised that being killed by 
autonomous weapons threatens human dignity, but even the defenders of a ban on these weapons seem 
to say that these are not good arguments “There are other weapons, and other technologies, that also 
compromise human dignity. Given this, and the ambiguities inherent in the concept, it is wiser to draw 
on several types of objections in arguments against AWS, and not to rely exclusively on human 
dignity.” (A. Sharkey 2019). 
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A lot has been made in the military guidance on weapons on keeping humans “in the loop” or “on the 
loop” – these ways of spelling out ‘meaningful control’ are discussed in (Santoni de Sio and van den 
Hoven 2018). There have been discussions about the difficulties of allocating responsibility for the 
killings of an autonomous weapon, and a ‘responsibility gap’ has been suggested (esp. Rob Sparrow 
2007), meaning that neither the human nor the machine may be responsible. On the other hand, we do 
not assume that for any event there is someone responsible for that event, and the real issue may well 
be the distribution of risk (Simpson and Müller 2016). The difficulty of allocating punishment is 
sometimes called the ‘retribution gap’ (Danaher 2016a) and it looks like a much harder problem than 
the responsibility or liability gaps. Risk analysis (Hansson 2013) indicates it is crucial to identify who 
is exposed to risk, who is a potential beneficiary, and who takes the decisions (Hansson 2018, 1822-
1824).  
3 Ethics for AI & Robotics Systems 
3.1 Machine Ethics 
Machine ethics is ethics for machines, for ‘ethical machines’, for machines as subjects, rather than for 
the human use of machines as objects (Floridi and Saunders 2004; Moor 2006; Anderson and Anderson 
2011; Wallach and Asaro 2017). It is often not very clear whether this is supposed to cover all of AI 
ethics of to be a part of it. Some pronouncements sound like they include all matters of human machine 
design: “machine ethics is concerned with ensuring that the behavior of machines toward human users, 
and perhaps other machines as well, is ethically acceptable” (Anderson and Anderson 2007, 15). Other 
authors on “ethical considerations in the development of intelligent interactive systems” focus on 
design, leaving out what humans can do with the machine: “AI reasoning should be able to take into 
account societal values, moral and ethical considerations; weigh the respective priorities of values held 
by different stakeholders in various multicultural contexts; explain its reasoning; and guarantee 
transparency.” (Dignum 2018, 1, 2). Finally, some of the discussion in machine ethics makes the very 
substantial assumption that machines can, in some sense, be ethical agents responsible for their actions, 
or ‘autonomous moral agents’ (see van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019). 
The basic idea of machine ethics is now finding its way into actual robotics where the assumption that 
these machines are artificial moral agents in any substantial sense is usually not made (Winfield et al. 
2019). It is sometimes observed that a robot that is programmed to follow ethical rules can very easily 
be modified to follow unethical rules (Vanderelst and Winfield 2018). 
The idea that machine ethics might take the form of ‘laws’ has famously been investigated by Isaac 
Asimov, who proposed ‘three laws of robotics’ (Asimov 1942): “First Law – A robot may not injure a 
human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. Second Law – A robot must 
obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 
Third Law – A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with 
the First or Second Laws.” Asimov then showed in a number of stories how conflicts of these laws will 
make it problematic to use them, despite their hierarchical organisation. Actual machine ethics for 
autonomous decisions in real-life situations would seem to involve a level of general intelligence that is 
well beyond current ability of AI. 
It is not clear that there is a consistent notion of ‘machine ethics’ since weaker versions are in danger of 
reducing ‘having an ethics’ to acting according to a rule or other notions that fall short of ‘reflecting on 
action’ or even ‘acting ethically’. And stronger notions that move towards artificial moral agents may 
describe a – currently - empty set. 
3.2 Artificial Moral Agents 
If one takes machine ethics to concern moral agents, in some substantial sense, then the agents in 
question can be called ‘artificial moral agents’. The question then is how to explain that notion, in 
detail, and which systems are such agents. We propose that the main questions will be about rights and 
responsibilities. Having said that, the discussion about artificial entities challenges a number of 
common notions in ethics and it can be very useful to understand these to abstract from the specific 
human case (cf. Powers and Ganascia forthcoming). 
Several authors use ‘artificial moral agent’ in a less demanding sense, borrowing from the software 
‘agent’ use (Allen, Varner, and Zinser 2000), in which case matters of responsibility and rights will not 
arise. James Moor distinguishes four types of machine ethics: ethical impact agents (example: robot 
jockeys), implicit ethical agents (example: safe autopilot), explicit ethical agents (example: using 
formal methods to estimate utility), and full ethical agents (“can make explicit ethical judgments and 
generally is competent to reasonably justify them. An average adult human is a full ethical agent.”) The 
earlier authors (Allen, Smit, and Wallach 2005; Moor 2006) propose several ways to achieve explicit 
ethical agents, via programming it in (operational morality), via ‘developing’ the ethics itself 
(functional morality) and finally full-blown morality with full intelligence and sentience. In some 
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discussions the notion of ‘patient’ plays a role: Ethical agents have responsibilities while ethical 
patients have rights (because harm to them matters). (Torrance 2011) suggests “artificial (or machine) 
ethics could be defined as designing machines that do things which, when done by humans, are criterial 
of the possession of ‘ethical status’ in those humans” – which he takes to be “ethical productivity and 
ethical receptivity” – his expressions for agents and patients. It seems clear that some entities are 
patients without being agents, e.g. simple animals that can feel pain but not make justified choices. On 
the other hand it is normally understood that agents will also be patients (e.g. in a Kantian framework). 
Programmed agents may not be considered ‘full’ agents because they are “competent without 
comprehension”, just like the neurons in a brain (Dennett 2017), meaning they challenge our ethical 
system of moral agency where agency and responsibility normally go together. It has also been said 
that there can be no ‘machine ethics’ because an ethics only deserves the name if the system has 
autonomously given it to itself and accepted it – so it cannot be ‘programmed in’ (Weber 2019) – this 
rejects all four of Moor’s types. 
3.2.1 Responsibility for Robots 
If the robots act, will they themselves be responsible, liable or accountable for their actions, in some 
sense? Or perhaps the distribution of risk should take precedence over discussions of responsibility? 
This concerns more substantial notions of autonomy than the technical one used above in (2.4). 
There is broad consensus that accountability, liability, and the rule of law are basic requirements that 
must be upheld in the face of new technologies (European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies 2018, 18), but the issue is how can this be done, and how can responsibility be allocated. 
Traditional distribution of responsibility already occurs: A car maker is responsible for the technical 
safety of the car, a driver is responsible for driving it safely, the public authorities are responsible for 
the technical conditions of the roads, traffic lights, etc. In general “The effects of decisions or actions 
based on AI are often the result of countless interactions among many actors, including designers, 
developers, users, software, and hardware. … With distributed agency comes distributed 
responsibility.” (Taddeo and Floridi 2018, 751). How this distribution might occur is not a problem that 
is specific to AI, but it gains particular urgency in this context (Nyholm 2018a), e.g. for autonomous 
vehicles (Nyholm 2018b). In classical control engineering, distributed control is often achieved through 
a control hierarchy plus control loops across these hierarchies. (See also the discussion on autonomous 
systems above.) 
3.2.2 Rights for Robots 
Some authors have indicated that it should be seriously considered whether even current robots must be 
allocated rights (Gunkel 2018a, 2018b; Turner 2019). It is not clear that there are positive arguments 
for this position; it seems to rely largely on criticism of the opposite position and on the empirical 
observation that robots and other non-persons are sometimes treated as having rights. In this vein, a 
‘relational turn’ has been proposed: If we relate to robots as though they had rights, then this is fine and 
we might be well-advised not to search whether they ‘really’ do have such rights (Coeckelbergh 2012, 
2018). This raises the question how far such anti-realism or quasi-realism can go, and what it means 
then to say that ‘robots have rights’ in a human-centred approach (Gerdes 2016). On the other side of 
the debate, Bryson has insisted with a useful [but admittedly problematic] slogan, that “robots should 
be slaves” (Bryson 2008), i.e. not enjoy rights (Gunkel and Bryson 2014). It has also been said that the 
reasons for developing robots with rights, or artificial moral patients, in the future are ethically doubtful 
(van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019) – this issue is easily confused with the issue of whether ‘machine 
ethics’ is a useful notion. 
Usually, being a person is supposed to be what makes an entity a responsible agent, someone who can 
have duties and be the object of ethical concerns – such personhood is typically a deep notion 
associated with free will (Frankfurt 1971) and perhaps all there is to that notion (Strawson 2004), or to 
the notion of being the kind of thing that can be praised or blamed (thus influencing future behaviour). 
It is often, but perhaps not necessarily, associated with having phenomenal consciousness. In order to 
have rights, being a person or a moral agent is not necessary – it is sufficient to be a moral patient that 
deserves moral consideration, e.g. an animal that can feel pain. 
There is a wholly separate issue whether robots (or other AI systems) should be given the status of 
‘legal entities’, or ‘legal persons’ – in a sense in which natural persons, but also states, businesses or 
organisations are ‘entities’, namely they can have legal rights and duties, so they can enter into legal 
contracts, can be sued, etc. The European Parliament has considered allocating such status to robots in 
order to deal with civil liability (Parliament 2016; Bertolini and Aiello 2018), but not criminal liability 
– which is reserved for natural persons. It would also be possible to assign only a certain subset of 
rights and duties to robots. It has been said that “such legislative action would be morally unnecessary 
and legally troublesome” because it would not serve the interest of humans (Bryson, Diamantis, and 
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Grant 2017, 273). In environmental ethics there is a long-standing discussion about the legal rights for 
natural objects like trees (C. D. Stone 1972). 
In the community of ‘artificial consciousness’ researchers there is a significant concern whether it 
would be ethical to create such consciousness, since creating it would presumably imply ethical 
obligations to a sentient being, e.g. not to harm it and not to end its existence by switching it off – some 
authors have called for a “moratorium on synthetic phenomenology” (Bentley et al. 2018, 28f). 
4 Singularity 
4.1 Singularity and Superintelligence 
The idea of the singularity is that if the trajectory of artificial intelligence reaches up to systems that 
have a human level of intelligence, then these systems would themselves seem to have the ability to 
develop further AI that surpasses human level, that is ‘superintelligent’. This sharp turn of events is the 
‘singularity’, from where onwards the development is out of human control. (So the terms ‘singularity’ 
and ‘superintelligence’ do not refer to the same object.) In some parts of the field it is common to 
distinguish ‘technical’ or ‘narrow’ AI from the aim of ‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI), which 
sometimes understood as identical to Searle’s notion of ‘strong AI’: “computers given the right 
programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states” (Searle 1980, 417). 
The fear “the robots we created will take over the world” had captured human imagination even before 
there were computers (e.g. Butler 1863) and it is the central theme in Čapek’s famous play that 
introduced the word ‘robot’ before actual robots existed (Čapek 1920) – science fiction has always 
been a strong inspiration for AI. It was first formulated as a possible trajectory of existing AI into an 
‘intelligence explosion’ to superintelligence by Irvin Good: “Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined 
as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the 
design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even 
better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion’, and the intelligence of 
man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need 
ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control“ (Good 
1965, 33). 
The optimistic argument from acceleration to singularity is spelled out by Kurzweil (1999, 2005, 
2012), who essentially points out that computing power has been increasing exponentially, i.e. 
doubling ca. every 2 years since 1970 in accordance with ‘Moore’s Law’ on the number of transistors, 
and will continue to do so for some time in the future. He predicted in (Kurzweil 1999) that by 2010 
supercomputers will reach human computation capacity, by 2030 ‘mind uploading’ will be possible, 
and by 2045 the ‘singularity’ occurs where computers far surpass humans, future development of 
intelligence is taken over by AI, and history is changed forever. The version of this argument that is 
now used more commonly (Chalmers 2010) talks about an increase in ‘intelligence’ of the AI system 
(rather than raw computing power), but the crucial point of ‘singularity’ remains the one where further 
development of AI is taken over by AI systems and accelerates beyond human level. (Bostrom 2014) 
explains in some detail what would happen if intelligence clearly surpasses human level, which he calls 
‘superintelligence’, and what the risks for humanity are. The discussion is nicely summarised in (Eden 
et al. 2012) and (Shanahan 2015). There are other possible paths to superintelligence, e.g. the complete 
emulation of the human brain on a computer (Kurzweil 2012; Sandberg 2013), biological paths, or 
networks and organisations (Bostrom 2014, 22-51). 
Despite obvious weaknesses with the identification of ‘intelligence’ with processing power, Kurzweil 
seems right that humans tend to underestimate the power of exponential growth. Mini-test: If you 
walked in steps in such a way that each step is double the previous, starting with a step of one metre, 
how far would you get with 30 steps? (Answer: to Earth’s only permanent natural satellite.) Indeed 
most progress in AI is readily attributable to the availability of degrees of magnitude faster processors 
and larger storage (Müller 2018). The actual acceleration and its speeds are discussed in (Müller and 
Bostrom 2016; Bostrom, Dafoe, and Flynn forthcoming); while (Sandberg 2019) argues that progress 
will continue for some time. 
The participants in this debate are united by being technophiles, in the sense that they expect 
technology to develop rapidly and bring broadly welcome changes – but beyond that, they divide into 
those that focus on benefits (e.g. Kurzweil) or on risks (e.g. Bostrom). Both camps sympathise with 
‘transhuman’ views of survival for humankind in a different physical form (e.g. uploaded on a 
computer) in authors like (Moravec 1990, 1998) and (Bostrom 2003a, 2003c). They also consider the 
prospects of ‘human enhancement’, in various respects, including intelligence - often called “IA” 
(intelligence augmentation), rather than AI. The notion of ‘human’ itself is up for grabs. It may be that 
future AI will be used for human enhancement, or will contribute further to the dissolution of the neatly 
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defined human single person. Robin Hanson provides detailed speculation about what will happen 
economically in case human ‘brain emulation’ enables truly intelligent robots or ‘ems’ (Hanson 2016). 
The argument from superintelligence to existential risk requires the assumption that superintelligence 
does not imply benevolence – contrary to several traditions in ethics, notably Kant (against Hume), that 
have argued higher levels of rationality or intelligence would go along with a better understanding of 
what is moral, and better ability to act morally (Gewirth 1978; Chalmers 2010, 36f). Arguments for 
existential risk from superintelligence typically deny this and say that rationality and morality are 
entirely independent or “orthogonal” dimensions – this is sometimes explicitly argued for as an 
“orthogonality thesis” (Bostrom 2012; Armstrong 2013; Bostrom 2014, 105-109). It is also conceivable 
that a superintelligence could decide to end humans existence for good ethical reasons. 
Criticism has been raised from various angles. Kurzweil and Bostrom seem to assume that intelligence 
is a one-dimensional property and that the set of intelligent agents is well-ordered, in the mathematical 
sense – but neither discusses intelligence at any length in their books. Generally, it is fair to say that 
despite some efforts, the assumptions made in the powerful narrative of superintelligence and 
singularity have not been investigated in detail. One question is whether such a singularity will ever 
occur – it may be conceptually impossible, practically impossible or just not happen because of 
contingent events, including people actively preventing it. Philosophically, the interesting question is 
whether singularity is just a ‘myth’ (Floridi 2016; Ganascia 2017) that is not on the trajectory of actual 
AI research; which is something that practitioners, especially from robotics, often support (e.g. Brooks 
2017). They may do so because they fear the PR backlash, because they overestimate the practical 
problems, or because they have good reasons to think that superintelligence is an unlikely outcome of 
current AI research (Müller forthcoming). This discussion raises the question whether the concern 
about ‘singularity’ is just a narrative about fictional AI that exploits human fears. But even if one does 
find negative reasons compelling and the singularity not likely to occur, there is still a significant 
possibility that one may turn out to be wrong in this view. Philosophy is not on the ‘secure path of a 
science’ (Kant 1791, B15), and maybe AI and robotics aren’t either (Müller 2019). So, it appears that 
discussion of the very high-impact risk of singularity has justification even if one thinks the probability 
of such singularity ever occurring is very low – as long as it is not too low (and that border is, again, a 
matter for discussion). 
4.2 Existential Risk from Superintelligence 
Thinking about superintelligence in the long term raises the question whether superintelligence may 
lead to the extinction of the human species, which is called an “existential risk” (or XRisk) for our 
species: The superintelligent systems may well have preferences that conflict with the existence of 
humans on Earth, and may thus decide to end that existence – and given their superior intelligence, 
they will have the power to do so (or they may happen to end it because they do not really care). 
Perhaps there is even an astronomical pattern that an intelligent species is bound to discover AI at some 
point, and thus bring about its own demise. Such a ‘great filter’ would contribute to the explanation of 
the “Fermi paradox” why there is no sign of life in the known universe despite the high probability of it 
emerging – and it would be bad news if we found out that the ‘great filter’ is ahead of us, rather than an 
obstacle that Earth has already passed. These issues are sometimes taken more narrowly to be about 
human extinction (Bostrom 2013), or more broadly as concerning any large risk for the species (Rees 
2018) – of which AI is only one (Häggström 2016). Bostrom also uses the category of ‘global 
catastrophic risk’ for risks that are sufficiently high up the two dimensions of ‘scope’ and ‘severity’ 
(Bostrom and Ćirković 2011; Bostrom 2013). These discussions of risk are usually not connected to the 
general problem of ethics under risk (e.g. Hansson 2013, 2018).  
Thinking in the long term, even on an astronomical scale, is the crucial feature of this literature. 
Whether the singularity (or another catastrophic event) occurs in 30 or in 300 or 3000 years does not 
really matter (Baum et al. 2019). This is part of an approach to focus more work on risks that have low 
probability but high impact, based on the observation that, traditionally, humans seem to spend a 
disproportionate amount of resources on risks with high probability but low-impact, even though seen 
from a classical expected utility calculation (decision theory, cost-benefit analysis) it may be more 
rational to tackle low probability high-impact risks (North 1968). The long-term view has its own 
methodological challenges, but has produced a wide discussion: (Häggström 2016) provides an 
overview of high-impact technological risk for humanity; (Tegmark 2017) focuses on AI and human 
life ‘3.0’ after singularity while (Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark 2015) and (Bostrom, Dafoe, and Flynn 
forthcoming) survey longer-term policy issues in ethical AI. Several collections of papers have 
investigated the risks of artificial general intelligence (AGI) and the factors that might make this 
development more or less risk-laden (Müller 2016b; Callaghan et al. 2017; Yampolskiy 2018), 
including the development of non-agent AI (Drexler 2019). 
Vincent C. Müller – ‘Ethics of AI & Robotics’ for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
– vs. 0.96 – public draft, http://www.sophia.de - 03.10.2019 17 
4.3 Controlling Superintelligence? 
In a narrow sense, the ‘control problem’ is how we humans can remain in control of an AI system once 
it is superintelligent. (Should we put it into a ‘box’ of sorts, should we hard-wire some aspects, should 
we prevent it from ignoring human intention, …?) (Bostrom 2014, 127ff). In a wider sense it is the 
problem how we can make sure an AI system will turn out to be positive, in the sense we humans 
perceive this (at least in the few areas where we do agree). The latter issue is sometimes called ‘value 
alignment’ of superintelligent AI; (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2016) define it formally as ‘cooperative 
inverse reinforcement learning’. 
How easy or hard it is to control a superintelligence depends to a significant extent on the speed of 
‘take-off’ from a system that is under human control to a superintelligent system. This has led to a 
particular attention to systems with self-improvement, such as AlphaZero (Silver et al. 2018) that have 
shown significant improvement in digital games (chess, Go, video-games) over short time periods – 
though they can currently not improve on their method of improvement. 
One aspect of this problem is that we might decide a certain feature is desirable, but then find out that it 
has unforeseen consequences that are so negative that we would not desire that feature after all. This is 
the ancient problem of King Midas who wished that all he touches turn into gold (as Stuart Russell 
pointed out), also captured in the expression “be careful what you wish for” (Armstrong 2014, 28ff). 
For example, the designer Robert Propst invented the flexible ‘Action Office’, but what came of it was 
the dreaded cubicle office furniture system in open plan spaces. The computer ‘Hal’ in the 1968 film 
“2001: A Space Odyssey” tries to kill the human crew in order to carry on with the mission – just as it 
was programmed to do. This problem has been discussed on the occasion of various examples, such as 
the ‘paperclip maximiser’ (Bostrom 2003b), or the program to optimise chess performance 
(Omohundro 2014). Despite orthogonality, superintelligent systems are typically imagined as having 
goals, including the goal of self-preservation. The problem is similar to the problem of expressing 
ethics in the form or laws, even with a hierarchy, in that both rely on the hope that the imagination used 
was sufficient to foresee all problems. There always seems to remain a risk that a well-intended system 
will have unforeseen negative consequences. Generally, programming means rather than ends is 
dangerous (Yudkowsky 2008), but even programming ends can lead to undesired outcomes. 
These approaches speculate about ultimately incomprehensible omniscient beings, the radical changes 
in a ‘latter day’, and the promise of immortality through transcendence of our current bodily form – so 
they have clear religious undertones (Capurro 1993; O'Connell 2017, 160ff). These issues also pose a 
well-known problem of epistemology: Can we know the ways of the omniscient? How does one do “AI 
theology” (Danaher 2015)? The usual opponents have already shown up: The atheists and the nihilists 
(Gerz 2018). The atheists slogan is “People worry that computers will get too smart and take over the 
world, but the real problem is that they’re too stupid and they’ve already taken over the world.” 
(Domingos 2015) – in other words, they say we need an ethics for the ‘small’ problems that occur with 
actual AI & robotics (sections 2 and 3 above), less for the ‘big ethics’ of existential risk from AI. 
5 Closing 
The singularity thus raises the problem of the image of AI again. It is remarkable how imagination or 
‘vision’ has played a central role since the very beginning of the discipline at the ‘Dartmouth Summer 
Research Project’ (McCarthy et al. 1955; Simon and Newell 1958). And the evaluation of this vision is 
subject to dramatic change: In a few decades, we went from the slogans “AI is impossible” (Dreyfus 
1972) and “AI is just automation” (Lighthill 1973) to “AI is will solve all problems” (Kurzweil 1999) 
and “AI may kill us all” (Bostrom 2014). This created media attention and PR efforts, but it also raises 
the problem how much of this ‘philosophy and ethics of AI’ is really about AI, rather than about an 
imagined technology. – As we said at the outset, AI and robotics have raised fundamental questions 
about what we should do with these systems, what the systems themselves should do, and what risks 
they have in the long term. They also challenge the human view of humanity as the intelligent and 
dominant species on Earth. We have seen issues that have been raised and we will have to watch 
technological and social developments closely to catch the new ethical issues early on, and to develop 
the necessary philosophical analysis. 
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